Strangers at the Door: Night Raids by International Forces Lose Hearts and Minds of Afghans by unknown
 The Open Society Institute’s 





Strangers at the Door 







A case study by the Open Society Institute and The Liaison Office 
 
 











The Open Society Institute and The Liaison Office 
 
 
Strangers at the Door: 




Afghan civilians have increasingly borne the brunt of the war in Afghanistan. Though 
insurgents have been responsible for most of the harm, the Afghan public has largely 
directed their frustration and anger at international forces. International forces have made 
significant efforts to address this anger by improving their conduct, in particular reducing 
civilian deaths due to airstrikes. One practice, however, that has changed little is the 
search and seizure operations known as night raids. 
 
Research conducted by the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Afghan 
nongovernmental organization, The Liaison Office (TLO), shows that these raids are 
widely associated with abuse and impunity. Night raids cause tremendous trauma within 
Afghan communities, often alienating the very people whom international forces are 
supposedly trying to protect. During night raids, international and Afghan soldiers force 
entry into local homes and search the premises after dark, often detaining many, if not all, 
of the men present. 
 
Given the international community‘s commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan by winning 
local trust and cooperation, night raids present a serious stumbling block. Afghans‘ 
negative perceptions of international military actors will not change as long as abuses 
associated with night raids continue. 
 
From September to December 2009, OSI and TLO conducted a study in the conflict-
prone southeastern provinces of Paktia and Khost to understand how Afghan 
communities viewed international forces and whether they considered new military 
policy reforms to be effective. Though the study focused on two provinces, similar 
responses have been documented in other regions of Afghanistan, suggesting a 
widespread, consistent problem. 
 
While conducting night searches may provide an element of surprise and an advantage to 
pro-government forces, it terrorizes local communities and increases the risk of 
indiscriminate harm to civilians in the area during these raids. Death, injury, property 
damage, and emotional stress commonly accompanying night raids erode public 
confidence and limit progress to protect the population. 
 
Night raids also compound problems stemming from a lack of due process guarantees. 
These raids are often based on misinformation or bad tips, leading to the detention of 
innocent people. These people are then frequently jailed for extended periods with 
inadequate means to challenge their resulting detention. This further discredits the justice 




While detention may be necessary in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, greater 
efforts should be made to ensure that night raids and other search and seizure operations 
do not undermine the broader policy aims of the international community to increase 
stability, improve rule of law and due process, and protect the population. 
 
1. Find alternatives to night raids whenever possible. 
These alternatives should recognize community concerns and be more in line with 
regular due process procedures. 
2. Coordinate night raids with local International Security Assistance Force 
commanders. 
Keep local commanders informed of any night raids in their area and involve 
them in authorization, targeting, and execution whenever possible, if not before 
than after an operation. 
3. Guard against misinformation. 
More rigorous triangulation of information with a broader and more diverse body 
of local sources, including the Afghan government, would help prevent raids from 
mistakenly targeting innocent civilians. 
4. Ensure that greater Afghan involvement is not a blank check for abuse. 
Most Afghans consider international forces guilty by association if they do not 
prevent accompanying Afghan forces from behaving poorly or breaking the law. 
5. Avoid working with unregulated irregular militias. 
These groups are difficult to hold to account and have a reputation for abuse. 
6. Restore confidence through greater accountability. 
Mechanisms that respond to complaints regarding night raids and can 
meaningfully address them within the military chain of command are essential. 
 
 
The report was written by Erica Gaston and Jonathan Horowitz on behalf of the Open 
Society Institute (OSI) and Susanne Schmeidl from The Liaison Office (TLO).  Research 
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Afghan civilians bear the brunt of war. Though international forces have made significant 
improvements toward better population protection—particularly by reducing civilian 
casualties linked to airstrikes—many Afghans still view them as equally or sometimes 
even more dangerous than insurgents. One of the main reasons for this is the continuing 
practice of night raids. 
 
Interviews with local communities suggest that the number of night raids has not 
noticeably decreased since new tactical changes were put in place in July 2009, and are 
now occurring in previously unaffected areas, such as Kunduz.1  Narratives collected 
from Khost, Paktia, and elsewhere also indicate that negative perceptions of international 
military actors will not change as long as the abuses associated with night raids continue.   
 
In addition to fuelling anti-foreign sentiments, conduct during these raids and subsequent 
detention practices raise questions of compliance with international law, undermines 
progress in strengthening Afghan rule of law and stability, and negates many of the 
positive effects gained by other population-centric steps taken by international actors and 
the Afghan government. 
 
While attacking homes at night, rather than daytime, may add an element of surprise and 
reduce the risk to pro-government forces, it dramatically increases the chances of 
indiscriminate use of force against innocent women, children, and men in the house. In 
doing so, it increases animosity in local communities, thereby undermining the larger 
strategic goal of winning support from local populations. As the newly appointed 
commander of the U.S. and NATO missions in Afghanistan, General Stanley 
McChrystal, himself noted: ―[W]e run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical 
wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents 
cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves.‖2 
 
Further, there is evidence that many of these raids are triggered by misinformation, 
leading to mistaken detentions, and that even those who are justifiably apprehended may 
be set free because of corrupt Afghan institutions. Both these factors make the relative 
value of this practice unclear. 
 
Taken as a whole, the costs of night raids, as they are currently conceived and conducted, 
likely outweigh the benefits. 
 
II. Background: Policy Changes in 2009 and the New Counterinsurgency Focus 
The number of civilian casualties rose dramatically in 2008, increasing 40 percent from 
2007. Though insurgents were responsible for most of the harm, the public directed their 
anger at international forces. Protests erupted nationwide over the high death toll from 
international forces‘ airstrikes and reports of offensive and abusive treatment during night 
raids and detentions.3 Many Afghans called on international troops to withdraw. 
International military began to realize that civilian casualties and conflict-related 




To reverse these trends, General McChrystal announced a new military strategy premised 
on counterinsurgency theory: the number of insurgents killed mattered less for overall 
victory than denying insurgents the support of Afghan communities. Critical elements of 
this new strategy included the need to limit harm to Afghan civilians, demonstrate respect 
for local customs, and improve the accountability of international forces and the Afghan 
government.4  McChrystal also rightly flagged the need to dramatically improve the 
Afghan law enforcement and justice systems, which are plagued by high levels of 
corruption, frequent detainee abuse, and widespread skill and resource shortages. 
 
The most significant step to implement this new strategy was a new tactical directive 
issued by McChrystal in July 2009. The tactical directive restricted activities, such as 
airstrikes, likely to result in civilian casualties, and urged troops to act with greater 
sensitivity to Afghan cultural and religious concerns. It mandated greater Afghan 
involvement in the practice of night raids: ―Any entry into an Afghan house should 
always be accomplished by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the support of 
local authorities…‖5 This tactical directive applied to both operating missions in 
Afghanistan: the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. 
Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A). 
 
Furthermore, the U.S. government drew up new detention procedures to grant detainees 
in U.S. custody in Afghanistan greater rights. The United States also opened a new 
detention facility to replace the Bagram Theatre Internment Facility, which had been 
fraught with allegations of detainee abuse and substandard detention conditions.6   
 
III. Community Impressions of Night Raids 
From September to December 2009, the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Afghan 
nongovernmental organization, The Liaison Office (TLO), conducted a study in the 
conflict-prone southeastern provinces of Paktia and Khost to understand how Afghan 
communities viewed international forces and whether they considered new military 
policy reforms to be effective. The study consisted of 20 focus group discussions (one 
with women), which recorded the views of over 150 participants, including local 
notables, elders, and shura members. The study also conducted more than 25 in-depth 
interviews with individuals (seven of whom were women) who participated in the 
discussion groups.  Though the study focused on two provinces, similar responses have 
been documented by researchers in other regions, suggesting that the views presented 
here occur across many other areas of Afghanistan.7   
 
Despite significant improvements in the conduct of international forces, Afghans remain 
critical of the behavior and lack of accountability of Afghan and international forces who 
engage in night raids, as well as their subsequent detention procedures. These concerns 
reinforce negative perceptions about international forces, eroding much of the strategic 







a) Preliminary Impact of Recent Policy Reforms 
 
Approximately six months after the tactical directive and other policy reforms were 
issued, the changes have already had a significant impact on some key issues. While the 
Human Rights Unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
recorded the highest number of civilian casualties in 2009 since the fall of the Taliban 
regime in 2001,8 it also noted a significant decrease in civilian deaths attributed to 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and international military forces (a 28 percent 
drop from 2008). 
 
While the new strategy is reducing civilian casualties caused by airstrikes, it has been less 
successful in addressing problems associated with night raids. The UNAMA report 
voiced concern over the ―excessive use of force‖ often accompanying these raids, 
reporting that 98 civilians were killed during night raids in 2009. The report also flagged 
―allegations of ill-treatment, aggressive behaviour and cultural insensitivity, particularly 
towards women.‖9 
  
Consistent with UNAMA‘s findings, few interviewees for this study were able to give 
examples of airstrikes that had happened in their province in the last six months since 
General McChrystal issued his July 2009 tactical directive, but many had fresh memories 
of night raids.  Afghans described recent incidents in which international forces and/or 
Afghan forces engaged in abusive treatment, unnecessarily destroying property and 
disrespecting cultural norms during house searches. In some cases, people said they 
witnessed detainees being gun butted or kicked, sometimes while handcuffed.10 
 
Former detainees and other witnesses to night raids reported international forces breaking 
dishes, destroying furniture, and setting vehicles on fire.  Because many compounds 
house dozens of people, this property destruction was widely viewed as unnecessary and 
drew complaints from non-targeted residents in the house and their communities. 
 
Not all observed trends were negative. Interviewees reported few recent examples of 
night raids that involved the desecration of holy texts and serious misconduct towards 
women, though they did note that these problems existed in the past and had not been (or 
could not be) forgiven. It is possible that the reduction of these incidents is due to the new 
tactical directive urging more respect for civilians‘ religious and cultural concerns, and 
which particularly instructed soldiers to ―account for the unique sensitivities toward local 
women.‖11   
 
Though it is impossible to verify the facts of each incident, allegations of some abuses are 
consistent enough to raise a question as to whether international forces have violated 
international law as well as their own applicable domestic military rules. While it is 
permitted to search houses and detain suspected fighters during wartime, international 
law requires that detaining powers follow basic standards of treatment. For example, 
beating a man who is disarmed and handcuffed would almost certainly violate the 




In addition, night raids are subject to the principles of proportionality and distinction 
under international humanitarian law.12  In other words, night raids must focus only on 
military targets, and any incidental harm they cause to civilians must be proportionate to 
the benefits of attacking the military target. Night raids that are accompanied by 
excessive force or result in significant harm to surrounding family members or properties 
raise serious concerns as to whether these principles are being properly respected. 
 
The degree to which governments participating in internal armed conflicts should rely on 
the law enforcement standards implicit in peacetime human rights law, as opposed to 
international humanitarian law standards, is an evolving area of international law.13 While 
this issue is unsettled as a matter of law, the costs and benefits as a policy matter are 
clear. Law enforcement standards provide greater protections against accidental harm, 
address greater accountability concerns, allow for better evidence gathering to increase 
the chance of accurate convictions and acquittals, and would instill stronger rule of law 
standards in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is strongly advisable that, where possible, military 
or other government forces conduct raids that they deem unavoidable in accordance with 
law enforcement and international human rights standards. 
 
b) Attacks on Medical Clinics and Other Humanitarian Organizations 
 
Civilian homes were not the only targets of night raids. Nongovernmental organizations 
and medical clinics also reported having facilities raided by mixed groups of international 
and Afghan armed forces. In one particularly egregious example, international forces led 
a raid on a Swedish Committee of Afghanistan (SCA) clinic in Wardak Province in 
August 2009. According to SCA, the troops forced entry into several rooms, tied up local 
staff and some patients‘ family members, and ordered some patients out of their wards.14  
International forces also reportedly ordered the clinic staff to report any patient suspected 
to be Taliban in the future.15  ISAF maintains that its forces sought permission before 
entering. 
 
Under international law, medical clinics, even if they admit and treat injured insurgency 
actors, are generally protected from attacks. UNAMA reported facts indicating that 
international forces exceeded what was permissible when they entered the medical 
facility in Wardak. 
 
c) Perceptions of International Forces 
 
The practices inherent in night raids—an intrusion into the home at night, interactions 
with women of the family—clash with fundamental notions of privacy. Afghans believe 
that women‘s quarters are sacrosanct and should not be touched by outsiders. Some 
women interviewed feared that they would be sent to hell for looking at the international 
forces or being seen by them during these raids.16 
 
Because these operations are so offensive to Afghan communities, reports of misconduct 
during night raids are especially prone to exaggeration. During the discussion groups, 
interviewees gave accounts of international forces tearing or chopping the Holy Quran 
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with an ax, taking women away in helicopters and returning them dead, and shooting 
babies or children at point-blank range. 
 
Even if some of these and other stories are due to insurgency propaganda, Afghans are 
ready to believe them. The perception is that forces willing to conduct night raids as a 
matter of standard protocol would also be willing to engage in other outrageous acts 
during these raids. 
 
While many claims go unsubstantiated and others are simply false, international and 
Afghan military forces should not ignore that they are built upon a reality of abuse, and 
that even the ―unbelievable‖ allegations shape the way Afghan communities understand 
the conflict. Whether propaganda, exaggeration, or fact, complaints about night raids 
spread rapidly through communities provoking extreme reactions. Following allegations 
that international forces violated the Holy Quran in a search operation in Wardak in 
October, 15 public demonstrations were organized countrywide.17   
 
Furthermore, such experiences create (or add to the already) negative perceptions of 
international forces, sometimes pushing individuals toward outright support for 
insurgents. As one interviewee suggested, ―If someone is handcuffed in front of women, 
he would see no other way left, but to head towards the mountains [to fight with the 
insurgents].‖18  Each night raid that takes place reinforces these perceptions and gives 
fresh fodder to insurgent propaganda. 
 
d) Lack of Accountability for Night Raids 
 
Community anger over night raids is equally rooted in a lack of accountability. Afghans 
often find it difficult to identify which forces were involved in a given incident or to 
determine the location of a detainee soon after capture. In addition to Afghan government 
officials, local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) or Forward Operation Bases 
(FOBs) are often the first point of contact a relative of a detainee will have with the 
military after a detention operation takes place. Several interviewees said that when they 
did try to seek information with international or Afghan forces they were ignored or 
threatened not to ask any more questions. 
 
―They cannot approach the base. They do not allow them to enter,‖ one community 
representative explained. ―A lot of people are simply afraid to go. They are afraid that if 
they go to ask about someone who is detained, they will also be attacked.‖19 
 
One respondent described an incident in July 2009 in Paktia province, in which a man 
appeared to have been deliberately killed during a night time raid. When the local elders 
went to the Afghan campaign forces, an irregular militia they believed was involved in 
the raid, to ask why the man had been killed they were told to drop the issue or they 




In May 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston 
criticized international forces for their unwillingness or inability to identify which 
international units were involved in military operations: 
 
Getting clarification from the international forces is like entering a maze. I 
experienced this maze myself. One ISAF commander explained that while 
he could confirm whether a particular operation was conducted by 
conventional ISAF troops and then clarify which national contingent they 
belonged to, he would have to pass the case up the chain of command to 
clarify whether it had been conducted by ISAF special forces, and that I 
would have to ask the commander in charge of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) to determine whether and which coalition forces were 
responsible.21   
 
Almost two years later, Alston‘s critiques are still relevant. Those leading night raids are 
often Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating out of regional commands, rather than 
from the local ISAF base or PRTs. Though efforts have been made to better incorporate 
SOF into the chain of command in 2009, the local ISAF commanders are often still 
ignorant as to what raids occur in their area of operations, and which forces are 
conducting them. During a November 19, 2009 meeting between the Regional Command 
North and humanitarian and development actors in Kunduz, one of the ISAF military 
officials voiced his frustration with recent US military/special forces activities in the area 
for not sharing any details about their operation, adding ―ISAF cannot influence anything 
the US Military/Special Forces do.‖22  Highlighting the concern about raids carried out by 
SOF, independent monitors in southern Kandahar and Helmand province noted that 
recently some raids have been carried out by ISAF rather than SOF, and that it is easier to 
raise concerns and track those who are accountable for these ISAF-led raids.23 
 
The lack of visibility over those conducting raids also weakens the potential for innocent 
families who are harmed to receive appropriate apologies or compensation, as was 
recommended in General McChrystal‘s assessment on the military strategy in 
Afghanistan.24  So far, ISAF has failed to set up a comprehensive system of compensation 
in Afghanistan, and instead it is up to the discretion of individual troops involved in a 
given incident.25  When those troops are not local to an area, or are not identifiable within 
the chain of command – as often happens in the case of night raids – there is almost no 
chance for affected civilians to receive an apology or to have their losses recognized or 
compensated.26   
 
There also appears to be insufficient accountability for and verification of the intelligence 
that led to many of these raids. Many people detained during night raids said they were 
targeted because their rivals or enemies deliberately passed misinformation to 
international forces. Though these allegations are hard to confirm, the fact that many 
detainees are soon released without charge, the frequency of wrongful aerial bombings, 
and the underlying local dynamics of many Afghan regions lend credibility to these 
claims.  As one shopkeeper from Paktia described, ―The Afghan National Army and the 
international forces have raided my house six times. Every time they searched my house, 
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they could not find anything and apologized after the search operation and told me that 
wrong intelligence had been given to them.‖27 
 
Research in other insurgency and civil war contexts has found that the motivations for 
informants to pass tips to one side or the other are often personal.28  Given this empirical 
research and the history of ethnic and tribal rivalries in Afghanistan, it is not surprising 
that many tips leading to night raids would be driven by personal motivations of the 
informant. While some tips are true, others are not. For this reason, stronger mechanisms 
for verifying information are imperative given the impact of these practices. 
 
Afghans point to these raids and complain that international forces operate under a 
culture of impunity. These critiques are not surprising, given the lack of visibility over 
how raids are authorized and which forces conduct them, and the absence of a 
mechanism to refer and address complaints about conduct after the fact. The civilian and 
military strategies in Afghanistan both emphasize the importance of rule of law and 
stronger government accountability for long-term stability. Reports of abuse and 
concerns about the lack of accountability for these raids, reinforce, rather than correct, 
existing flaws in the Afghan detention and justice system. With the international 
community spending billions of dollars annually to improve rule of law, international 
forces are working at cross-purposes by not having in place a serious system for 
accountability that can respond to night raids that result in abuse, property destruction, 
wrongful detentions, and the denial of due process. 
 
e) Conduct of Afghan National Security Forces, Irregular Militias, and Other 
Afghan Actors 
 
One of the positive reforms made by the July 2009 tactical directive was to have the 
involvement of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) at all raids, a step that many 
Afghan communities requested. 
 
Unfortunately, however, some of the benefits of this positive reform are undermined by 
allegations of abuse by Afghan forces or officials during the raids or afterwards during 
detention. When international forces detain individuals, they will often hand them over to 
Afghan institutions (Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA) or 
the National Directorate of Security (NDS)), which are plagued with corruption and 
allegations of torture or other mistreatment.29 Those detained by international forces 
frequently reported having to pay a bribe worth several thousand U.S. dollars to secure 
their release. 
 
Interviewees in particular complained about mistreatment by the ANP and by 
unaccountable irregular militias—often called ―campaign‖ forces or ―Armed Security 
Groups.‖ These campaign forces are especially problematic as they are not part of the 
Afghan National Security Forces, exacerbating concerns about the accountability of 
armed groups engaged in night raids side-by-side with international forces. As the UN 




[I]t is absolutely unacceptable for heavily-armed internationals 
accompanied by heavily-armed Afghan forces to be wandering around 
conducting dangerous raids that too often result in killings without anyone 
taking responsibility for them.30 
 
Interviewees believed that these campaign forces, as well as other Afghans, intentionally 
provided international forces with misinformation to settle personal grievances or tribal 
rivalries. The vast majority of interviewees blamed wrongful detentions on deliberate 
misinformation. Nearly every person interviewed said that it was better that these raids or 
alternative detention practices be conducted by Afghan forces, so long as their 
involvement was accompanied by greater efforts to ensure accurate information and 
respectful and accountable conduct on the part of Afghan forces. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Afghans are victims of the growing violence between insurgents and international forces. 
For many Afghans living in contested areas, there is no neutral zone. Attempts by local 
communities to distance themselves from either international forces or insurgents 
inevitably leads to civilians being targeted by one side or the other. 
 
A tribal elder from Khas Uruzgan explained: 
 
There are now six governments—PRTs, Hazara Militias [i.e., campaign 
forces], ANA, ANP, district government, and the Taliban.  We are caught 
in the middle of all of them. If you side with the government, then the 
Taliban will kill you. If you side with the Taliban, the government will 
take you or the bombs will fall.31 
 
The conduct of night raids and the impunity of those participating in them are main 
contributors to Afghan complaints about international forces. These raids provide fuel for 
propaganda aimed against the Afghan government and the international presence in 
Afghanistan. These practices are counterproductive, keeping the international community 
from achieving primary goals such as establishing stability and garnering local trust and 
support. 
 
From a strategic military perspective, these practices undermine many of the benefits 
gained by the positive reforms within the new counterinsurgency strategy. Despite 
reductions in the number of airstrikes and associated civilian deaths by international 
forces, narratives from Khost and Paktia, which are fairly representative of Afghans 
living in other contested areas, suggest that the dominant perception of international 
forces as either indifferent to, or even intentionally causing, Afghan suffering will not 










1. Find alternatives to night raids whenever possible. 
The practice of night raids should be reviewed with particular scrutiny of why and in 
what circumstances operations must be conducted during nighttime, and why traditional 
law enforcement safeguards for detaining suspects are not appropriate or possible. 
Though in some cases night raids may be the only means for detaining an individual, in 
many cases there are clearly less offensive alternatives that should or could be 
considered. Afghan communities rightfully ask why international forces cannot simply 
detain a suspect during the daytime, in a less violent manner that is more in-line with 
regular due process procedures. 
 
2. Coordinate night raids with local International Security Assistance Force 
commanders. 
Night raids can generate enormous hostility among local populations, in one stroke 
undoing months of counterinsurgency efforts by the local commander. Yet because so 
many night raids are carried out by Special Operations Forces, local commanders often 
complain that they do not even know when raids are conducted in their own area of 
operations. Better coordination will help to protect these gains and reduce the negative 
consequences of poorly planned raids. Keep local commanders informed of any night 
raids in their area and involve them in authorization, targeting, and execution whenever 
possible. 
 
3. Guard against misinformation. 
In a society as fragmented by ethnic and tribal lines as Afghanistan, it is paramount that 
military actors triangulate information more rigorously using a larger number and a more 
diverse body of local sources, including the Afghan government. It is equally important 
that international forces thoroughly record and collect evidence when conducting night 
raids or other search and seizure operations. Doing so will increase the accuracy and 
credibility of legal proceedings to which the detainee is ultimately subject. 
 
4. Ensure that greater Afghan involvement is not a blank check. 
While expanding Afghan involvement and leadership in the authorization and operation 
of night raids is a significant improvement, and one that communities generally endorse, 
it is not a panacea. For most Afghans, international forces are guilty by association if they 
do not prevent accompanying Afghan forces from behaving poorly or breaking the law. 
Thus, passing greater responsibilities on to Afghan forces does not mean avoiding blame 
for how night raids are conducted. It is therefore necessary that Afghan National Security 
Forces are held accountable for abuses and trained not to repeat the mistakes of 
international forces. 
 
5. Avoid working with unregulated irregular militias. 
Working with armed security groups or campaign forces that fall outside the official 
Afghan government security apparatus is a recipe for disaster. These groups are difficult 
to monitor and have a reputation for abuse. Research shows that Afghans prefer to 
encounter security forces that they can link to a government body that holds them 
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accountable, even if only marginally so.32  At least they know to whom to complain, or 
who should be accountable in theory. 
 
6. Restore confidence through greater accountability. 
After eight years of night raids, Afghan communities are understandably mistrustful of 
international forces‘ promises to improve their practices. Rebuilding this lost trust will be 
difficult, particularly if night raids continue to be used regularly. Even when conduct 
does improve, the very fact that night raids continue can slow recognition of progress. 
International forces will have to do more to restore lost confidence and regain the trust of 
Afghan communities.   
 
Improving accountability would be a key confidence-building measure. Specific changes 
might include: being more transparent about night raids, at least after the fact if not 
before; holding Afghan counterparts accountable; and communicating to affected 
communities when and how any misconduct is addressed. Providing apologies and, 
where appropriate, compensation to innocent families who are mistakenly targeted may 
also mitigate community anger after an incident, and improve the perception of 
accountability. 
 
To facilitate this, international forces should establish a mechanism to receive and 
respond to complaints and inquiries regarding night raids and to enforce remedies where 
valid. For it to be effective, the mechanism should have access to all relevant information 
about the night raid, including a pre-raid written explanation as to why it needed to be 
conducted at night instead of during the day. For purposes of accountability, each raid 
should also be approved in writing by an appropriate ISAF or US military official in the 
chain of command. 
 
This mechanism must be accessible to Afghan communities and should be allowed to 
provide relevant information about the operations in question. A civilian casualty 
tracking cell was established in 2008; however, as UNAMA noted, this cell has not been 
particularly responsive and is not capable of ―engaging on substantive issues with any 
authority.‖33  Real accountability will mean not only being able to receive complaints and 
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